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Bail-out or no bail-out? – Corona




The COVID-19 epidemic hit all EU Member States and their economies. At the
moment no one can seriously estimate how long the epidemic will last, which
serfdoms and hardships it will bring, and how the economy will respond once the
turmoil has faded. It is clear, however, that recovery programs have to be put on
track as fast as possible to stimulate the economy and ease the individual hardship.
It is an open question how Member States and the EU will be able to stimulate the
economy after the existential threat of the epidemic has faded and how – at the
same time – they will be able to upgrade their health care systems, improve their
capacities to respond to future epidemics, and improve the living conditions of their
citizens. It is undeniable that vast amounts of revenue must be raised in a fairly short
period of time to finance all these crucial steps.
How this is to be done is subject to debate. Here the stakes and claims are clear:
While “the South”, including inter alia Italy, France, and Spain, advocates Corona
Bonds (meaning financial instruments issued by multiple (or all) Member States
or by a European entity in order to indebt the issuers), “the North”, including inter
alia Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Finland, is reluctant to these financial
instruments. The political situation is complicated since the governments from the
“North” will find it difficult to explain to their constituents why “they” should pay for the
debts of the “others”. It is also feared that Corona Bonds will in essence resemble
Euro Bonds, that were widely and controversially discussed during the height of
the sovereign debt crisis in 2011/2012 and were strongly rejected by the German
and other governments. Governments from the “South” on the contrary will stay
away from money if it comes with the obligation to push unpopular reforms and may
amplify ensuing economic problems.
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The main outcomes of the Council of Finance Minsters
Given the opposing views it comes as no surprise that the Council of Finance
Minsters found it extremely complicated to agree on measures that lead to sharing
financial risks and burdens. After intense discussions the Ministers of Finance
reached a political compromise on 9 April. After intense discussions the Ministers of
Finance reached a political compromise on Thursday night last week.
The compromise has four main pillars. First, the European Investment Bank (EIB)
will set up a pan-European fund which will finance companies. Second, credit lines
from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will be granted to euro area Member
States under soft conditions. The EU will, third, (under the acronym SURE) support
Member States with up to 100 billion Euro by establishing “a temporary loan-based
instrument for financial assistance”. This program is designed to finance measures
of Member States and shall “primarily support the efforts to protect workers and
jobs” such as, for instance, short-time work compensation schemes. Fourth, and
finally, a new recovery fund will be set up that shall be “temporary, targeted and
commensurate with the extraordinary costs of the current crisis”. How the recovery
fund will be financed is left unclear; the elephant in the room – Corona Bonds – is not
addressed at all. Here, the ensuing deliberations of the Heads of State of the EU will
have to find an answer which, of course, will be complicated, as the competing views
still differ strongly from each other.
However, the political (and legal) debate has already begun. Elmar Brok (CDU)
has for instance expressed his will to implement “innovative financial instruments”
publicly. It is therefore save to assume that Corona Bonds are still “on the table”.
Their legal soundness, however, remains a topic of debate.
Corona Bonds and the no-bailout clause
As already indicated Corona Bonds are feared to resemble Euro Bonds under a
different name. This brings back the old debate whether these bonds would be
compatible with both national constitutional law and EU law. To keep this article
rather short I shall focus on EU law in the following. Setting aside the question if the
EU has the competence to propose Corona Bonds itself the main question under
primary law is if Corona Bonds violate the no bail-out clause of Art. 125 TFEU.
By now a multitude of politicians and academics have spoken out in favour of
Corona Bonds. However, the only proposal that addresses the legal obstacles
directly is the one from Goldmann et al. launched on Verfassungsblog. They
advocate a model in which the revenue raised by the issued Corona Bonds will
be used to fund European projects on the one hand and Member States on the
other. While their proposal is appealing in numerous ways, I am sceptical that
the exemption of Art. 125 TFEU for the “joint execution of a specific project” (my
emphasis) will be suitable here since a fair share of the revenue will be made
available to Member States who will most likely have broad discretion when
spending the money. This, and the fact that mutual debts also affect future debts, will
bring the no bail-out clause back onto the legal (and political) playing field.
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However, the case for Corona Bonds may not be as problematic as the case
for Euro Bonds that was intensely debated in 2011/2012. it is obvious that the
COVID-19 epidemic itself has nothing to do with the fiscal policy of one or more
Member State(s). COVID-19 does not distinguish between people, societies, or
states. Second, it is also clear that Member States will have to invest thoroughly
in order to upgrade their health care systems and prevent a recession now and
not in the far away future. Now, a strict interpretation of the no bail-out clause may
point to the fact that mutual debts also affect older debts or, put differently, the
may incentivize borrowing more money because capital markets will no longer
discipline the fiscal policy of Member States. However, if the goal of Art. 125 TFEU
is that Member States “maintain budgetary discipline” (so the ECJ in Pringle), then
exceptional circumstances cannot be overlooked if one interprets the clause. Corona
Bonds are issued because of a specific and mutual event that poses an imminent
threat to individuals and societies, they will be capped at a certain amount, and they
will be limited to a certain time period. Put differently, a certain amount of debt will be
mutualised but this amount will be limited in both time and capacity. Corona Bonds
would not mutualise all the debts of Member States.
One may also fear that Member States will have to step in for other Member States
in case one of them is not able to meet its debts. This problem was solved in the
ESM treaty by adopting a clause that ensures that the liability of Member States vis-
à-vis the ESM will be limited. Some Member States also adopted a legal reservation
before ratifying the ESM treaty in order to limit their exposure to the fund. These
measures may also be adopted vis-à-vis Corona Bonds and would limit the liability of
participating Member States.
The tricky question will be if the money that will be raised by issuing Corona Bonds
can be granted by the recovery fund under no or very little conditions. In Pringle
the ECJ adopted a teleological view and emphasized that Art. 125 TFEU shall
promote a solid fiscal policy by Member States. It therefore emphasized the “strict
conditionality” of the financial assistance given by the ESM. However, the ESM is
designed to help Member States that have problems to refinance their expenditures.
It was not set up to fund the expenditures of multiple or all Member States because
of a mutual existential threat.
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